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I. Introduction 
The theory of debt examined here is known variously as "efficient taxation over time," "opti- 
mal taxation over time," the "equilibrium approach to fiscal policy," or "tax smoothing." Tax 
smoothing results when an efficient government fixes tax rates today to minimize the costs of 
taxation over time. Given the long-run constraint of a balanced budget, if the marginal costs of 
taxation are an increasing function of the amount of resources taxed (i.e., the "tax rate"), then 
minimization of the total costs of taxation implies that the planned tax rate will be constant over 
time. Tax rate changes will be unpredictable and the tax rate will behave as a random walk. 
Efficient governments will not adjust tax rates to accommodate temporary changes in expendi- 
tures and revenues. Instead, governments will minimize tax rate changes by "tax smoothing." 
Smoothing tax rates implies that temporary changes in government spending and output result 
in deficits and surpluses. Therefore, tax smoothing provides a theory of government debt. The 
model is primarily due to Barro [1]. The goal of this paper is to contribute to our understanding 
of government debt. The focus of this paper is on state and provincial debt, or what is generally 
referred to as "state and local debt." 
Nearly every state government in the United States has a balanced budget rule. However, 
balanced budget rules are not sufficient to rule out tax smoothing, as state governments could 
build up budget surpluses in good times to smooth budgets over the business cycle. If state gov- 
ernments are smoothing tax rates, then their budget surpluses are endogenous. Contrary to the 
state governments, provincial governments in Canada have no balanced budget rules. If provincial 
governments are smoothing tax rates, it could explain the behavior of their budget deficits and 
surpluses. 
As shown by Barro, tax smoothing implies that the (overall) tax rate behaves as a random 
walk and the tax rate would be a nonstationary time series with a unit root. This study examines 
the tax smoothing hypothesis in two ways. First, the random walk implication is examined di- 
rectly by testing the null hypothesis that the tax rate time series has a unit root. Second, if the 
tax rate behaves as a random walk, then changes in the tax rate should be unpredictable from 
past information. If past information can predict tax rate changes, this would provide evidence 
in favor of an alternative hypothesis. 
A rejection of tax smoothing suggests that state and provincial tax rates respond to current 
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conditions, rather than seeking to minimize the costs of intertemporal tax distortions. For ex- 
ample, a rejection of tax smoothing by state governments, combined with balanced budget rules, 
suggests that state governments balance budgets annually in response to current conditions.' This 
could explain the occurrence of state budget crises during times of slow output growth and/or 
fast expenditure growth. A rejection of tax smoothing by provincial governments might suggest 
some sort of political business cycle to explain their sometimes large budget deficits, even on 
current expenditures. 
Empirical testing is undertaken using annual data for fifty states and ten provinces respec- 
tively. Tests are performed with panel data, created by pooling data on each state or province. 
The use of panel data significantly increases the power of the unit root test to reject its null 
hypothesis. Results clearly reject tax smoothing by state governments, but results cannot reject 
tax smoothing by provincial governments. Differences in resource mobility is suggested as an 
explanation for the differences in tax smoothing. 
Section II looks at the theory of efficient taxation over time. Section III describes the model. 
Section IV discusses the tax rate data. Sections V and VI present the empirical tests. Section VII 
summarizes the results. 
II. Efficient Taxation over Time 
Tax smoothing implies that efficient governments set tax rates today to minimize the cost of 
intertemporal resource substitution, subject to a long-run balanced budget constraint. Given all 
available information, the tax rate would be considered as permanent and would not be arbitrarily 
changed. Only new information about the future path of government spending and output would 
cause governments to change the tax rate. No prediction could be made of future tax rate changes; 
therefore, the tax rate would behave as a random walk, and today's tax rate would be the best 
predictor of future tax rates. 
Empirical testing of the tax smoothing hypothesis has focused on federal governments.2 Re- 
sults of these tests have been mixed. Barro [2; 3], Kochin, Benjamin, and Meador [13], and Huang 
and Lin [11] find general support for tax smoothing by the U.S. federal government. Gupta [10] 
finds evidence supporting tax smoothing when examining the Canadian federal tax rate. Sahasakul 
[16], and Bizer and Durlauf [6; 7] reject tax smoothing for the U.S. federal government. Trehan 
and Walsh [18] reject tax smoothing when examining U.S. federal tax revenues. These tests ex- 
amine either the time series properties of the tax data, or estimate regression models suggested 
by tax smoothing. Application of these tests to a single state or provincial government is not 
recommended. The time series available for a single state or province is too short to get reliable 
estimates. By examining panels created by pooling data from fifty states or ten provinces, the 
1. Some states on a biennial budget cycle need only deal with a budgetary shortfall every two years. 
2. One exception has been Horrigan [12]. In a regression based on Barro [1), Horrigan looks at the estimated 
coefficients for deviation from the values predicted by tax smoothing. Using quarterly U.S. federal debt, Horrigan finds 
some support for Barro's model. Using combined federal, state and local debt Horrigan finds weaker support. Using only 
state and local debt, he finds "little confirmation" of Barro's model, and concludes that state and local governments are 
not tax smoothing. Potential problems with Horrigan's test include the use of time trends to estimate trend real GNP and 
trend real government expenditures. If trend output and spending are nonstationary, then their regression on time may 
result in spurious regressions. Horrigan also makes no distinction between current and capital debt. A distinction may 
be important, as resource mobility encourages state and local governments to finance capital expenditures with debt. 
ARE STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TAX SMOOTHING? 981 
size of each sample is greatly increased, resulting in more efficient estimation and significantly 
increased power to reject the null hypothesis. 
Benjamin and Kochin [4; 5] suggest the ability of efficient governments to smooth tax rates 
may be restricted at the state and local levels. Mobility of taxable resources may prevent state 
and local governments from tax smoothing. As temporary deficits and surpluses occur, mobile 
resources could seek out jurisdictions where the current benefits of government spending exceed 
the current costs. This would limit the ability of efficient state and local governments to smooth 
tax rates and could explain the large number of balanced budget rules that exist among these 
governments in the U.S. 
The mobility of taxable resources is likely to be less between provinces in Canada than be- 
tween states in the U.S. for a number of reasons. First, Canada's provinces are generally larger in 
area than most states. Second, having two official languages, with French being confined largely to 
Quebec, and to a lesser extent New Brunswick, mobility would be more costly for large segments 
of the Canadian population.3 Third, many cities in the U.S. are in close proximity to one or more 
cities in a neighboring state. Neighboring cities among two or more Canadian provinces is rare. 
All of these examples would make the relative cost of resource mobility greater in Canada than 
in the U.S. Population mobility estimates support this: the percent of the population changing 
state or province each year is greater in the U.S. than in Canada.4 
III. The Model 
The model defines a government budget identity at period t as follows: 
Gt + rBt_1 7t Y, + Bt - Br-1 (1) 
where Gt is real total government expenditures excluding interest on the public debt for state or 
province i, r is the real rate of interest for state or province i, B, is the real stock of public debt 
outstanding for state or province i at the end of period t, Yt is the real output of state or province 
i, and Tt is the "tax rate" of state or province i. Tt Yt equals the total real tax revenue collected 
by state or province i in time t, or Tt. Dividing terms in equation (1) by real output of state or 
province i, an intertemporal budget constraint can be derived as follows: 
Z(1 + 
p)-JEgt+j 
+ (1 + 
p)bt-1 
= (1 + 
p)-ETt+j 
(2) 
j=O j=O 
where E is the expectation operator, gt E Gt / Yt, t = Tt / Y, b = Bt / Yt, and p is the real interest 
rate minus the growth rate of real output for state or province i, and is assumed to be constant 
over time. 
The model assumes the marginal cost, or marginal excess burden, of tax collection is an 
increasing function of Tt. Total costs of taxation are assumed to increase quadratically with Tt, and 
3. It is also interesting to note that until Canada's constitution in 1982, provinces were legally able to deny em- 
ployment in certain industries to workers from other provinces. The constitution now prohibits this, except under some 
limited circumstances. 
4. See, for example, U.S. Bureau of the Census [19] and Statistics Canada [17]. 
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the marginal excess burden function is assumed to be time invariant. The time path of government 
spending is assumed to be exogenous. As shown in Barro [1], minimization of the present value 
of the total cost of taxation over time, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, implies 
equality of t, over time. Sahasakul shows that after substituting ETr+j = rt for all j : 0 in (2), 
equation (3) can be derived as follows: 
Tt = g + pb -_ (3) 
where gt is the permanent expenditures to output ratio of state or province i at time t, and pbt,_ 
equals debt interest payments net of the real output growth rate times the ratio of outstanding 
real public debt to real output for state or province i at the end of period t - 1. gt is equivalent 
to an annuity value of present and expected future government spending relative to output, and 
is similar in structure to a measurement of permanent income. 
Equation (3) shows that only the ratio of permanent government spending to output, and the 
stock of previously outstanding government debt relative to output, will determine the tax rate 
of state or province i at time t. Temporary changes in spending or output result in a temporary 
deficit or surplus, with no change in Tt. 
Given all information available today about the future path of spending and output, the tax 
rate rt is expected to remain unchanged. Therefore, today's tax rate is an unbiased predictor of 
future tax rates. This condition can be described in equation (4) as follows: 
E(7t+j lIt) = Tt (4) 
where It is the information relevant to tax smoothing available to state or province i at time t. 
Equation (4) implies that the tax rate behaves as a random walk. Equation (5) describes the 
random walk condition as follows: 
t = I + Tt-1 + Et Et 
r (0, U2) and E(EtEt-j) = 0 j : 0 (5) 
where ~ is a constant term or "drift" for state or province i, and Et is a white noise error term that 
is independent and identically distributed. Tax smoothing may or may not exhibit a drift in tax 
rates. With the case of a constant marginal cost function for tax rates over time, tax smoothing 
implies that p = 0. 
The random walk model of equation (5) implies that Tt is nonstationary with a unit root. A 
unit root implies that the coefficient on Tt-_ 
in equation (5) is equal to one. Repeated substitution 
for 
Tt-I 
into (5) gives equation (6) as follows: 
t 
,t = t + pt + 6Ej. (6) 
j=1 
A nonstationary Tt implies that innovations in et result in permanent changes in 7,. Therefore, 
under the null hypothesis of tax smoothing changes in Tt7, are permanent, and rejection of a unit 
root for Tt rejects tax smoothing. 
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IV. Tax Rate Data 
Tests using panel data will be undertaken with annual data for the fifty U.S. states and the ten 
Canadian provinces over the periods 1963-89 and 1961-89 respectively. Tit is calculated as total 
tax revenue divided by Gross State Product (GSP) for each state i, and total tax revenue divided 
by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each province i. Data definitions and sources are shown 
in the appendix. 
Tax revenue for each state government is measured over the fiscal year (FY), while GSP is 
measured over the calendar year (CY). Therefore, tax revenue for each state i will be converted 
to the calendar year by equation (7) as follows: 
CYit = qiFYit + (1 
- 
i)FYit+l (7) 
where 4 = .5 for forty-six states, 4 = .75 for Alabama and Michigan, 4 = .25 for New York, 
and 4 = .67 for Texas.5 
Some revenue received by state and provincial governments may be considered as nontax 
revenue. This revenue could occur if governments sell, rent, or lease any assets they own. This 
type of revenue is not a tax per se since people are paying some rent or fee for the use of a 
government owned asset. Federal government transfer revenue to the states or provinces is also 
a type of nontax revenue. There is no reason why tax smoothing should occur for nontax reve- 
nue; therefore, to examine the tax smoothing hypothesis more accurately, nontax revenue will be 
omitted from Tit.6 
V. Unit Root Tests 
Unit root tests in panel data are undertaken on Tit, the tax rate of state or province i at time t. 
The random walk implication of tax smoothing can be examined by testing the null hypothesis 
of a unit root in Tit. Rejection of a unit root rejects tax smoothing. 
Levin and Lin [14] describe the asymptotic properties of testing for a unit root in panel data. 
Their paper extends the work of Dickey and Fuller [8], among others, to panel data. In the case 
where the disturbances are independent and identically distributed, and no individual-specific 
fixed effects are present, a unit root in Tit causes the t-statistic on Tit-1 to converge to a standard 
normal distribution. With individual-specific fixed effects a unit root causes the t-statistic on Tit-1 
to converge to a non-central normal distribution. Serially correlated disturbances also cause the 
unit root t-statistic to diverge from the standard normal distribution but can be corrected by in- 
cluding lagged values of Arit. The asymptotic distribution of the t-statistic is not affected by the 
inclusion of a constant term, time trend, or time-specific fixed effects, or by the values of any 
individual-specific fixed effects. Levin and Lin provide critical values of the t-statistic on Tit-1 
for various finite sample sizes, with and without the presence of individual-specific fixed effects. 
The unrestricted unit root test in panel data can be specified in equation (8) as follows: 
5. The fiscal year ends June 30 in all but four states. The fiscal year ends September 30 in Alabama and Michigan, 
March 31 in New York, and August 31 in Texas. Equation (7) is similar to equation (3.1) in Evans and Karras [9]. 
6. To be consistent with the model, nontax revenue must also be subtracted from government spending in equations 
(1)-(3). 
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Table I. State Tax Rate Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: 1964-1989 
.02687 - .48960ri,_ + .52568Ari,_ - .07237Arit_2 + .41540Arit-3 +.18685Ait-4 + .19927Ait,_5 
(13.791) (-15.988)** (15.848) (1.997) (11.921) (5.883) (6.238) 
+c2Oi + f•t + 7it + fit 
R2 = .4406 S.E. = .00233 F(124,925) = 5.875 
.02090 -.37583it_1 + .47564Ayit-1 
- .01959Arit-2 + .31480Ayit-3 
+ .15928Ait-4 + i + it + iit + f 
(11.782) (-14.393)** (15.104) (-0.559) (10.416) (5.004) 
R2=.4249 S.E. = .00239 F(124,975) = 5.808 
.01734 -.31003rit-1 +.46347Arit-1 -.12445Arit-2 +.32726Ait_3 + ji + t + it + it 
(10.767) (-13.958)** (15.321) (-4.172) (10.979) 
R2 =.4162 S.E. = .00241 F(124, 1025) = 5.892 
.01268 -.21810Tit_1 +.32700Ait_1 - .10700Ait-2 + i + t +i+ it 
(7.756) (-10.168) (11.087) (-3.373) 
R2 = .3219 S.E. = .00261 F(124,1075) = 4.116 
.01425 -.2500Sit-I + .32146A-it1 + •i + , + it + it 
(9.351) (-13.357)** (10.895) 
R2= .2982 S.E. = .00265 F(124, 1125) = 3.855 
Notes: The dependent variable is A7i,. Unit root tests are shown with correction for serial correlation using the 
augmented Dickey and Fuller test with lags one through five. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Critical values for the 
t-statistic of Ti,-1 are -10.35 and -10.89 at the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively, and come from Table 5 
in Levin and Lin for a sample size of N = 50 and T = 25. 
**Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. 
k 
ATit= 
W- +.)it+iTt 
+ 
T1-t-1i 
+ 1 AOjTitj 1+ Eit (8) 
j=1 
,it is the tax rate for state or province i at time t. A is the first difference operator. 3 is a parameter 
used to test the null hypothesis of a unit root. wi and Ti are individual-specific fixed effects. wi is 
a state or province-specific intercept term equal to one for state or province i, and zero otherwise. 
rlit is a state or province-specific time trend, where Ti is equal to one for state or province i, 
and zero otherwise. Tt is a time-specific fixed effect equal to one at time t, and zero otherwise, 
and would allow for the possibility of a break in the series. Oj is a parameter, and k is the maxi- 
mum number of lagged values of 
aTit_. 
E AOjAit 
corrects for serial correlation in eit and is 
the panel data equivalent of the augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) test described in Said and 
Dickey [15]. eit is an error term that is independently and identically distributed across states or 
provinces and time, with zero mean and finite and nonzero variance, and is independent of wi, 
rqi, and -t. The test for a nonstationary Tit can be made by estimating equation (8), and checking 
the null hypothesis that / = 0. The alternative hypothesis of stationarity would be /3 < 0. 
7. With a dependent variable of mit in (8), the unit root null hypothesis would be / = 1 and the alternative 
hypothesis would be / < 1. 
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Table II. Provincial Tax Rate Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: 1962-1989 
.04851 -.427387ri,_ + .06473Arit-1 + .11752Arit-2 + .14359A it-3 + .08594Ait_-4 + .06251Arit_5 
(3.951) (-4.236) (0.640) (1.235) (1.602) (1.017) (0.800) 
+Ai + A, + Ajit + Ait 
R2 =.4952 S.E. =.00532 F(46, 183) = 3.902 
.04595 -.40817it-1 + .04208Anit_1 + .11792Ayit-2 +.12936Amit-3 +.04962Ait-4 + iw + t 
+ t + fit 
(4.348) (-4.760) (0.465) (1.369) (1.592) (0.665) 
R2 =.5021 S.E. =.00525 F(46, 193) = 4.231 
.03953 -.35571Tit-1 + .01216Arit-_ + .09161Atit-2 +.11711Ait-3 + Ci +t + it + fit 
(4.243) (-4.723) (0.145) (1.151) (1.602) 
R2 =.4888 S.E. = .00523 F(46, 203) = 4.220 
.03299 - .30112it-1 - .02432Ait-1 +.04112Ait_2 + i + + it + fit 
(3.899) (-4.484) (-0.310) (0.567) 
R2= .4694 S.E. = .00526 F(46, 213) = 4.096 
.02958 -.27312rit1 - .02962Arit_ + i + ft + t + it 
(3.926) (-4.721) (-0.421) 
R2= .4624 S.E. = .00519 F(46, 223) = 4.169 
Notes: The dependent variable is Ani,. Unit root tests are shown with correction for serial correlation using the 
augmented Dickey and Fuller test with lags one through five. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Critical values for the 
t-statistic of Ti,-1 are -5.42 and -5.94 at the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively, and come from Table 5 in 
Levin and Lin for a sample size of N = 10 and T = 25. 
**Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. 
One advantage of using panel data, compared to a single time series, is the increased number 
of observations and greater degrees of freedom. Levin and Lin show that the power to reject the 
null hypothesis of a unit root, against a stationary alternative, increases significantly in panel data, 
and increases more rapidly with the number of time periods than with the number of individuals 
in the panel. 
Unit root tests in panel data for the fifty states and ten provinces over the time periods 
1963-89 and 1961-89 respectively, were performed as follows.s Results are shown in Tables I 
and II. 
State government results are shown in Table I. Correction for serially correlated disturbances 
is made by using the ADF test with one to five lags of Anit-J. Critical values of the t-statistic 
testing the unit root null hypothesis ~ = 0 are -10.35 and -10.89, at the 5% and 1% levels of 
significance respectively.9 Except for the case of j = 2 in the fourth ADF test, the null hypothesis 
of a unit root is clearly rejected for state governments. Four of the five t-statistics are much greater 
than their 1% critical values.1o 
8. The length of the state time series is limited by the availability of data on Gross State Product. The length of 
the provincial time series is limited by the lack of consistent data prior to 1961. 
9. Critical values come from Table 5 in Levin and Lin for sample size N = 50 and T = 25. 
10. Four state governments have limited balanced budget rules. California, Connecticut, and New York require 
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Provincial government results are shown in Table II. Critical values of the t-statistic testing 
the unit root null hypothesis 3 = 0 are -5.42 and -5.94, at the 5% and 1% levels of significance 
respectively." Contrary to the state government results, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be 
rejected for provincial governments in any case. Provincial government results support a random 
walk with drift for Tit, where the drift varies by province and over time. Such a drift could occur 
if, for example, the marginal cost of tax collection differs by province and changes over time. 
VI. Tests For Orthogonality 
The random walk implication of tax smoothing implies that changes in Tit are unpredictable from 
past information. Therefore, predictability of A-Tit rejects tax smoothing. It may also be the case 
that governments are not tax smoothing but that changes in spending and output, for example, 
cause Tit to behave as a random walk. Therefore, to further examine the random walk implica- 
tion, and to test for evidence of an alternative hypothesis, regression of Anit on lagged values of 
ATit, Agit, and real output growth, Ayit, will be undertaken.12 Results of estimation are shown 
in Table III.13 
State government results clearly reject the random walk implication of tax smoothing. All 
four lagged values of Anit, two lagged values of Agit, and three lagged values of Ayi,, are signifi- 
cant at the usual levels, with all but Agit-3 significant at the 1% level. Contrary to this, no lagged 
variables are significant in the provincial government tests, at the usual levels of significance. The 
above are in agreement with the unit root tests: tax smoothing is rejected for state governments 
but cannot be rejected for provincial governments.14 
VII. Conclusion 
This study examined state and provincial government tax rates for evidence of tax smoothing. 
Results shown here reject tax smoothing by state governments but cannot reject tax smoothing 
by provincial governments. 
only that the Governor submit a balanced budget, while Vermont has no explicit rules. All four of these states can carry 
over deficits. To see if these states should be excluded from the panel, unit root tests were undertaken with a panel of 
these four states alone. Results are similar to those shown above. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in four of 
the five ADF tests undertaken, at the 1% level of significance. Therefore, all fifty states are included in the panel tested 
above. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that states without balanced budget rules be examined separately. 
Results are available from the author upon request. 
11. Critical values come from Table 5 in Levin and Lin for sample size N = 10 and T = 25. 
12. Ayit was calculated as ln(yiyit -), 
where yi is real Gross State Product for state i, or real Gross Domestic 
Product for province i, respectively. 
13. State or province-specific intercept terms were not significant, and were excluded from the results shown in 
Table III. Whether state or province-specific intercept terms were included or excluded did not affect the results shown 
in Table III. 
14. As of 1987, Arkansas, Kentucky, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas had 
biennial budgets with biennial legislative cycles. As such, these states would appear to be limited to making only biennial 
tax rate changes. To see if inclusion or exclusion of these states makes a difference to the results, tests were undertaken 
excluding these states from the panel. Results are similar to the full sample results shown above. Tax smoothing is rejected 
at the same significance levels. Therefore, all fifty states are included in the tests shown above. Another reason for leaving 
these "biennial" states in the panel is that even these states sometimes make annual budget reviews. Results of testing are 
available from the author upon request. I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting that states with annual and biennial 
budgets be examined separately. 
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Table III. State and Provincial Tests of Lagged Information 
State Government Test of Lagged Information 
ATi, 
= -.00036 - .60066Anrit - .54378Arit-2 +.46509Ayit-3 --.18820Ait_4 
- .07712Agit_1 +.00796Agit-2 
(-1.016) (19.100)** (-16.089)** (13.720)** (-6.132)** (-3.377)** (0.309) 
-.05199Agit-3 + .02883Agit-4 + .02377Ayit1 - .04068Ayit-2 + .02108Ayit-3 + .00456Ayit-4 + "7t + it 
(-2.071) (1.380) (7.458)** (-10.690)** (5.493)** (1.393) 
R2= .4313 S.E. = .00227 D.W. = 2.032 F(33, 1066) = 24.503 1964-1989 
Provincial Government Test of Lagged Information 
Arit = -.00367- .11698Arit-1 +.03288Ayit-2 +.04499Arit-3 -.05736Ait-4 
+ .01759Agit-1 +.00429Agit-_2 
(-1.837) (-1.532) (0.424) (0.566) (-0.753) (0.600) (0.139) 
+.03805Agit-3 -.00745Agit-4 +.01082Ayit-1 +.01446Ayit-2 +.00782Ayit-3 -.01357Ayit-4 + Tt 2fit 
(1.251) (-0.271) (0.844) (1.156) (0.635) (-1.079) 
R2 =.3839 S.E. =.00568 
D.W. 
= 2.037 F(35,204) = 3.632 1962-1989 
Notes: 
A•ri 
and Agi, are the first differenced tax rate and government spending to output ratios, and Ayit is the growth of 
output, for state or province i at time t, respectively. r, is a time-specific intercept term. ei, is the residual. t-statistics are shown 
in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level. *Significant at the 5% level. 
Two types of tests were performed to examine the null hypothesis of tax smoothing. First, 
unit root tests were undertaken in panel data to directly test the random walk implication of tax 
smoothing. A unit root was rejected for U.S. state tax rates, but could not be rejected for Canadian 
provincial tax rates. Second, if governments are tax smoothing and tax rates behave as a random 
walk, then tax rate changes would be unpredictable from past information. The first differenced 
tax rate was regressed on lagged first differences of the tax rate, the ratio of government spending 
to output, and real output growth. Past information was found to be significant in predicting state 
tax rate changes, but not significant in predicting provincial tax rate changes. 
Results suggest that state governments do not smooth tax rates, for example, by building up 
reserves in more prosperous times, but instead adjust spending and tax rates each year or two 
to balance their budgets. For state governments, business cycles result in changes in tax rates 
and spending that would be unnecessary if these governments were tax smoothing. Provincial 
government results support tax smoothing and contribute towards explaining the behavior of pro- 
vincial government debt. Greater resource mobility between states than provinces was suggested 
as an explanation for the differences in tax smoothing. 
Data Appendix 
United States 
Gross state product, by state: 1963-76, printed document; 1977-90, diskette, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
GNP deflator, U.S., (1982 = 100): 1929-90, National Income and Product Accounts, 1982 edition, and 
Survey of Current Business, various editions. 
Real gross state product, by state: gross state product for each state divided by the U.S. GNP implicit 
price deflator (1982 = 100), multiplied by one hundred. 
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Tax revenue and government expenditures, by state: 1963-76, State Government Finances, annual pub- 
lication; 1977-90, diskette, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
Canada 
Gross domestic product, government expenditures, and tax revenue, by province: Statistics Canada, 
Provincial Economic Accounts, Annual Estimates, 1985-1989, 13-213, Ottawa, 1991; Provincial Economic 
Accounts, Historical Issue, 1961-1986, 13-213S, Ottawa, 1988. Tax revenue is total revenue minus nontax 
revenue. Nontax revenue includes "interest on loans, advances and investments" to crown corporations, 
"remittances from government business enterprises," "royalties" from natural resource ownership, "profits 
from liquor commissions," and transfers from the federal government. Quebec's tax revenue includes revenue 
from the Quebec pension plan. 
GDP implicit price deflator, Canada (1986 = 100): 1929-90, Statistics Canada, Canadian Economic 
Observer, Historical Statistical Supplement 1990/91, 11-210, Ottawa, 1991. 
Real gross domestic product, by province: gross domestic product for each province divided by the 
Canada GDP deflator (1986 = 100), multiplied by one hundred. 
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